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This paper attempts to paint a coherent picture of the effects of ageing on a small, open, 
economy with large pension funds in different institutional settings. Quantitative scenarios are 
projected with an applied computable general equilibrium model with institutional details. We 
find that ageing leads to a tighter labor market, increasing costs for both pension funds and 
the government, and leaving the economy vulnerable to financial and further demographic 
shocks. We show that defined benefit pension arrangements can be destabilizing, but less so if 
an average-wage variable-indexation contract is chosen. Government can help by adopting a 
policy of tax smoothing, but the single most important determinant of the net burden of 
ageing is the eventual size of the increase in labor market participation of older workers. The 
intergenerational welfare effects of demographic shocks and changes in international interest 
rates are sizable and should be an integral part of the assessment of different policy 
instruments. 
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Ageing, pensions and the economy
The pension system in the Netherlands consists of three pillars: a government-run pay-as-you-
go system, funded compulsory occupational pension schemes and voluntary private savings.
The size of the second pillar, funded pensions, is considerable: in the year 2000 the funds had
accumulated around 100% of GDP in assets. For many people, the accumulated rights on these
funds constitute an important part of their retirement provions.
In the coming decades, the Dutch population will age due to the combined effects of a lower
birth rate, a lower mortality rate and the baby boom that followed World War II. These develop-
ments, together with the maturing of their membership, will severely reduce the premium base
of occupational pension funds compared to their future obligations. The ratio between obliga-
tions and the premium base is about six today, but will rise in the coming decades. This makes
pension funds more susceptible to risk: adverse shocks on ﬁnancial markets can no longer be
easily absorbed by raising premiums.
At the same time, ageing makes labor relatively scarcer than capital. This is bad news for
maturing pension funds, who have their obligations coupled to the wage rate, but depend on the
rate of return on capital for their income. As capital income declines, their obligations rise. A
compounding problem is that the increasing demand for nontraded goods and services (such as
care for the elderly) caused by ageing will squeeze the labor market, leading to additional wage
inﬂation.
Finally, several European countries seem ill prepared for the ageing problem. It is feared
that ageing will saddle these countries with considerable ﬁnancial and budgetary problems. This
can cause an inﬂationary spiral that degrades the value of European ﬁrms, with adverse effects
on the real return to pension funds’ wealth. All these setbacks loom at a time when the pension
funds are more vulnerable to risk because of their shrinking premium base. Thus, not only pay-
as-you-go systems but funded systems appear to be vulnerable to ageing. This paper aims to
show how large this vulnerability is.
We analyze the macro-economic interdependencies between ageing, risks and pension funds
in an applied general equilibrium framework, explicitly taking into account the multiple rela-
tionships between the economy and occupational pension funds. The two are linked in several
ways: on the one hand, the value of the funds’ assets and obligations depends on macroeco-
nomic developments on the Dutch labor market and the international ﬁnancial markets. On
the other hand, the level of pension premiums and beneﬁts affects the labor market, the capital
market and the goods market. The complicated two-way interaction between pension funds and
the rest of the economy has important consequences involving for instance the distribution of
income between active and retired generations.
Structure of the paper
We proceed as follows. After a short introduction to our model, we describe the benchmark
scenario. We then explore different ways to deal with the ﬁnancial burdens of ageing. We
discuss policy options for pension funds as well as the government, the latter being in charge of
the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.
2Both parties—pension funds and government—start off in a state of disequilibrium. With
expected ﬁnancial returns as they are and the current level of premiums, pension funds cannot
ﬁnance future pensions that are fully indexed to gross wages. Raising premiums or reducing
indexation are alternative ways of addressing this problem. We investigate the implications of
these alternatives for a number of macroeconomic variables (including wages, employment and
gross production) and for the standard of living for current and future generations.
The current levels of taxation are also insufﬁcient to cover the future ﬁscal costs of ageing.
The rising net PAYG beneﬁts, tied at present to net market wages, will force the goverment to
pick up an increasing part of the PAYG bill through general taxation. This will cause either tax
rates or the national debt to rise. We analyze the macroeconomic implications and intergenera-
tional distribution issues, and study a number of policy options: smoothing tax rates by cutting
public debt, stimulating labor participation and importing labor from abroad.
To explore the vulnerability of the Dutch pension funds and the national economy, we proceed
by analysing the effects of an adverse shock to the rate of return on capital. Lower rates of
return may be caused by either world wide ageing or imported inﬂation from European countries
suffering from ﬁscal imbalances.
Finally, we analyze how these results are affected if the tradability of goods and services
declines. With the pension funds sustaining national consumption when the number of pension-
ers rises, prices of nontradeables increase, causing wage inﬂation and therefore higher (deﬁned
beneﬁt-) pension obligations for occupational pension funds.
The purpose of the paper is twofold: ﬁrstly, it aims to show the different channels through
which ageing and pensions impact the economy, how these effects propagate, what the feedback
effects are, and how the income distribution across and within generations is affected. Secondly,
it aims to quantify these effects through numerical simulations, thereby allowing one to assess
the relative importance of these different channels.
2 The IMAGE model
The interactions between ageing, pension funds and the Dutch economy are studied using the
IMAGE model. This dynamic overlapping generations-model is documented in Broer (1999).
The analysis is conducted in the tradition of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and can be com-
pared to Kotlikoff et al. (2001), B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003) and Beetsma et al. (2003), among
others. It differs from these approaches in a number of ways: we concentrate on ageing in a
small, open economy, which does not affect returns on international ﬁnancial markets. Fur-
thermore, we focus on the funded deﬁned-beneﬁt pension system and the ways in which policy
choices in that system interact with the economy. Even though it is a part of our model, we
do not analyze alternative policy choices in the PAYG pension system, as this has already been
the subject of much analysis in the international literature. This section introduces the model
without trying to be exhaustive—most mathematical detail is left out, for instance. For a com-
plete overview of the model, we refer the reader to the documentation on our website (see
http://image.ocfeb.nl.) However, Table 1 presents the key parameters and appendix A gives
some background on the optimization problems: the problem for households is discussed in A.1
and that for ﬁrms in A.2.
3Table 1: Some key parameters
α 0.02 labour saving technical progress
β 0.02 rate of time preference
r 0.04 real rate of interest
γ 0.25 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ηH 0.25 elasticity of productivity in the time preference of households
σu 0.56 intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of goods
and the leisure-care composite
σv 0.65 intratemporal elasticity of substitution between leisure and health care
σy 0.5 elasticity of substitution between raw materials and value added in the
tradable goods sector
σH 0.5 elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the tradable
goods sector
δ 0.115 technical depreciation of capital
 0.281 net replacement rate of PAYG pension as a fraction of the average wage
rate
φ0 0.7 total pensions as a fraction of the ﬁnal wage at full pension build-up
In the IMAGE model, 560 types of households are active every period (the standard period
is one year): there are 80 cohorts, and each cohort features 7 types of workers, differing in ex-
ogenous productivity. These types thus represent different income-groups in the economy. Each
household consistently maximizes lifetime utility, using labor-leisure allocation and consump-
tion as its instruments. The mathematical structure of the household problem is the subject of
appendix A.1 on page 16. Firms maximize their value, deﬁned as the present value of the stream
of dividends. From this follow the optimal labor and investment demands. The model is based
on recent data and incorporates the institutions of the Dutch economy that are most affected
by ageing: the government, the health sector and the pension funds. We assume a competitive
labor market, so that wages are equated among the three production sectors: the government,
the health care sector and the rest of the private sector. Their size can be read from Table 2.
Table 2: Some key variables
Employment volume per sector (1000 man-years)
Government (with education) 728
Health care 661
Firms 4963
Wealth (% GDP 99)
Government debt 55.6%
Pension funds assets 97.7%
The government levies (proportional) taxes on consumption, and labor- and capital income.
That money is spent on government consumption, interest payments, subsidies and lump-sum
transfers. Public consumption is a ﬁxed fraction of GDP; public subsidies go to public health
insurance, which is reimbursed a ﬁxed fraction of its expenditures, and to the PAYG pensions,
4to the extent that the exogenously ﬁxed premiums do not cover the costs. Age-speciﬁc transfers
are tied to the gross wage rate. The government aims to maintain a constant public debt-GDP
ratio and uses the income tax rate to close its budget. Its initial debt rate is about 56% (Table 2).
The two mandatory pension systems are a PAYG scheme, which pays out a uniform basic
minimum pension after age 65 that is tied to the wage rate, and a funded occupational pension
scheme that provides beneﬁts to top up the basic public pensions. Dutch occupational pension
funds are large: in 1999, their combined assets were almost equal to the nation’s GDP. Pension
funds are capital-based and receive premiums out of working-age persons’ wages.
The premium is levied on that part of the wage that exceeds the so-called franchise, and
payment confers to the participant the right to a deﬁned-beneﬁt pension. Pensions are based on
the last-earned wage, are tied to the level of gross wages in the economy. Their level depends on
the accrued rights of the worker. The fund earns the international interest rate; discrepancies be-
tween its assets and the present value of its obligations are covered by adjusting the premium at
a speciﬁed pace. Contributions to the pension fund are deductible from taxable income while the
beneﬁts later in life are taxed. In the PAYG scheme the contribution rate is ﬁxed and shortages
are covered by the state.
There are two types of health insurance, private and public, for agents on either side of a
statutory income ceiling. Below the ceiling, agents have mandatory insurance through public
health insurances. The public insurance scheme reimburses in full, with help of the state. Public
health insurance ﬁxes its premiums, which are proportional to income, so that its budget is bal-
anced each year. Privately insured households, in contrast, pay a lump sum contribution. The
private health insurance sector transfers some of its premium income to the public insurance
system to compensate that sector for the bad health risks of low-income households. Special
medical treatments, which are difﬁcult to insure on the private insurance market, are covered
by a special insurance sector (AWBZ) to which both publicly and privately insured households
contribute. Health expenditures, ﬁnally, require complementary time allocation from the con-
sumers.
The model abstracts from a number of institutions, including several early-retirement schemes.
Agents are endowed with perfect foresight, so that risks do not ﬁgure in our calculations. We do
not model differences between men and women, and abstract from bequests using a Yaari (1965)
cohort-level inverted life-insurance. The absence of bequests may lead to an overestimation of
the intergenerational effects of shocks, as bequests typically help smooth those effects across
generations. Pension funds are homogenous and represented by a single, representative fund.
Markets, including the labor market, clear every period ruling out unemployment. We abstract
from business cycle considerations to focus on the long-term effects of demographic trends.
Our model, with its assumption of perfect foresight and intertemporal maximization by agents,
produces a benchmark scenario that can be used for policy analysis concerning long-run issues.
While wages are determined nationally, the return to capital is determined on international
ﬁnancial markets. We assume a constant real rate of return of 4% but also explore a case in
which the rate of return declines.
53 The benchmark path
In the benchmark scenario, the starting point of our simulations, the assets of pension funds are
not large enough to cover the obligations to current and future retirees (including an indexation
of beneﬁts to wages) and premiums are below their long-run level. This scenario is an attempt
to approximate the current situation, even though much of the model is calibrated to 1999 data.
The lack of funds in 1999, which was not actually observed in that year, can be explained as
follows: ﬁrst of all, we assume an average real return to capital of 4%, which are lower than the
returns that were anticipated in 1999. Secondly, the ﬁnancial markets had not yet reached their
top in 1999.
Variable premiums
On the base path, funds use their premiums, the percentage of income above that franchise that
is paid to into the pension fund, as an instrument to cover the shortage in assets. The premium
responds to the coverage rate (assets as a ratio of current pension obligations), which is targeted
at1.05. Thelowpremiumrateinthebaseyear, combinedwiththesmaller-than-desiredcoverage
rate, leads to a sharp increase in premiums in the base year. We have constrained the premiums
to a maximum of 25%, with a maximum yearly increase of 2 percentage-points.
The effects of ageing for the cost level of pension funds and government can be seen from
ﬁgure 1. The income tax rate increases when the dependency ratio goes up, and reaches its
highest level in 2040. Rising costs of the PAYG scheme play an important rol in this increase.
After an initial increase, occupational pension premiums stabilize at their long run level around
16%.
Figure 2 gives the gross wages (corrected for 2% technological growth). Wage costs peak
around the time when the labor market is tight due to ageing. Net wages1 are in the same ﬁgure.
These (also corrected for technological growth) are under pressure in the next decades due to
rising tax rates and, initially, higher pension premiums. Higher tax rates also affect the net
(funded) pensions in the same ﬁgure. However, as pensioners do not pay pension premiums the
decrease in net pensions is smaller compared to that in net wages.
Higher costs of labor reduce the demand for labor, while lower net wages depress labor
supply. Together with demographic developments, this results in falling employment until 2030
(seeﬁgure3). Grossdomesticproduct(correctedfortechnologicalgrowth)reﬂectsthedownturn
in employment.
Pension funds face two problems on the benchmark path: a low coverage ratio and a low initial
premium. The tight labor market exacerbates these troubles because the resulting inﬂationary
pressure on gross wages increases pension fund obligations. Despite the tighter labor markets,
net wages decline compared to net pensions due to higher occupational pension premiums.
1Net wages refers to the payment that the worker receives after taxes, employer-paid premiums
and the pension fund premiums.
64 Policy instruments for pension funds
In the base case, the ﬁnancial problems of occupational pension funds are shifted to active work-
ers. To protectthe purchasingpowerof workerscompared tothat ofthe retiredpopulation, funds
can opt for alternative instruments to address their ﬁnancial problems. We discuss a number of
alternative measures, which are rather extreme but are intended to delineate the borders of the
playing ﬁeld for pension funds. In the end, pension funds probably will opt for a combination of
measures. The measures involve suspending beneﬁt indexation and eliminating the ﬁnal-wage
system in favor of a system based on average wages.
Fixed premium, variable indexation
In our ﬁrst alternative simulation, we let the pension premium increase to its long run level of
16% straight away (ﬁgure 4). This means that the fund’s ﬁnancial troubles are no longer borne
by the working population. Instead, current retirees carry the burden of the initial disequilibrium
because their pensions are no longer indexed to gross wages as long as the fund’s assets are too
low (ﬁgure 5). (We allow lower indexation up to −4%; this level of indexation corresponds to
nominal freezing of the pensions, with 2% inﬂation and 2% technological growth). Under this
rule, additional indexation is possible if the coverage ratio exceeds 1.05. This way, pensioners
share in both positive and negative shocks.
Pensions lag behind gross wages about 1% each year during the ﬁrst decade. Figure 6
shows the effects of reducing indexation for the net pensions. Reducing indexation leads to
temporarily lower pensions, where net pensions lag behind the purchase power development of
active workers for two decades. The effect fades after the generations whose pensions have been
cut are no longer present. Generations that start retirement in 2020 or later proﬁt from increased
indexation (see ﬁgure 5) and a relatively high ﬁnal wage, caused by the tight labor market in
2020 (ﬁgure 2). This explains why net pensions grow faster than net wages between 2020 and
2040 (see ﬁgure 6). The use of the indexation instrument instead of the premium instrument
eases the costs on labor and protects net wages in the early years. This boosts total employment
(ﬁgure 7).
The welfare effects2 on different generations are in ﬁgure 8. The year of birth of the different
generations is on the horizontal axis. Generations that have just retired when indexation is
reduced lose the most. Their beneﬁts from funded pensions make up the largest part of their
income, as opposed to older generations who rely more on the ﬁrst (PAYG-) pillar. Generations
born between 1960 and 1990 do not retire until after the indexation is no longer reduced. They
gain relative to the base path because of their lower pension premiums.
Average-wage pensions
Another policy option for pension funds is the use of average-wage pensions instead of ﬁnal-
wage pensions. Under the former system, pensions are based on the average wage earned over
2Welfare effects are a percentage of remaining lifetime utility, compared to the base path. Welfare
is generated by consumption as well as leisure. The welfare effect in ﬁgure 8 is the average effect on
seven different income groups. We will report average effects only if their pattern between income
groups is sufﬁciently similar.
7the worker’s entire career, albeit indexed to the sector-wide wage level to correct for inﬂation
and the standard of living. The switch takes place, unexpectedly, in the base year.
Thereisatransitoryregime: forworkerswhohadalreadyenteredintotheﬁnal-wagesystem,
the average wage until the base year is set to their current wage. From then on, the indexation
of their rights follows the sector’s average wage instead of their individual wage path.
The accumulation rate of pension rights is increased in this plan, so that the expected ﬁnal
pension is equal to that in the ﬁnal-wage scheme. Nevertheless, the shift to an average-wage
system shows a lower level of initial premiums (if premiums are the fund’s instrument) due to
the fact that most of the baby-boom generations are still in the middle of their career when the
switch is made–compare ﬁgure 9 to ﬁgure 1. This makes the ﬁnal-wage system expensive, as
many members of this generation enjoy a consideable backservice over their accumulated rights.
The premiums under the average-wage system are more stable, because they are not inﬂuenced
by these ﬂuctuating backservice-obligations.
The average-wage system increases the net wages with respect to the base path (see ﬁg-
ure 10), which contributes to an increase in the supply of labor (ﬁgure 11). The higher net
wages reﬂect the inital lower costs of the system. Pension beneﬁts initially increase under the
average-wage system because older employees whose wage proﬁles are over the peak, actually
proﬁt from the introduction of the average-wage system and its terms of transition (ﬁgure 10).
Their current rights are protected by the terms, while they can increase their future rights using
the new, higher, rate of contribution. On top of that, the fact that their ﬁnal wage is lower than
their current wage no longer affects the value of their pensions.
The opposite holds for younger generations, who have not yet made their careers.3 Their
pension beneﬁts are lower because the backservice on their previous contributions no longer
exists. The higher rate of accumulation, which works to improve their beneﬁts, is not enough to
overcome this loss. However, these lower beneﬁts do lead to an increase in labor supply, caused
by the young generation’s desire to increase their saving for retirement.
The welfare effects of a switch to average-wage pensions show differences not only between
generations, but also between different income groups. Figure 12 shows the effects for three
groups in current and future generations. The low incomes correspond to 10% lowest incomes
in a cohort, the high incomes are the top 5% of a generation. The latter lose when the switch to
an average-wage system is made, because their wage proﬁle goes up the most in their ﬁnal active
years, giving them a generous backservice under the ﬁnal wage system. The lower and middle
incomes proﬁt from the new system. The gains for lower incomes are relatively modest as their
involvement in the funded-pension system is small. Figure 12 further shows that the cohorts in
the middle and lower incomes that proﬁt the most are those that are just before retirement. As
indicated above, these cohorts have little career (and hence, backservice) left but do proﬁt from
the higher accumulation rate. Note, ﬁnally, that the effects on national income and labor supply
are relatively modest compared to the changes in the income distribution.
Average-wage pensions with conditional indexation
A major advantage of the average-wage system over the ﬁnal-wage system is the increased
3These perverse aspects of our, admittedly simple, transition rule can easily be mitigated in prac-
tice, for instance by making the accumulation rate dependent on the age of the participant.
8power of the indexation instrument. Under this system, reducing the indexation of existing
rights is possible not just for the rights of current retirees, but also for those who are still in the
current labor force, whose claims are indexed with the growth of wages in the economy. The
increased effectiveness of the indexation instrument is illustrated by the following case, in which
we switch off the premium instrument by setting premiums at their long-run level immediately
and use only the indexation of current (worker and pensioner-) rights to guide the coverage
ratio to its desired value. This is comparable to the simulations in the previous paragraph, in
which the indexation instrument was employed exclusively to restore the coverage ratio in the
ﬁnal-wage system. However, we will ﬁnd that this instrument is much more effective under an
average-wage system.
The results of this simulation are in ﬁgures 13-17. The ﬁrst ﬁgure shows that the premium
has indeed been set at its long-run level.4 As the risk surrounding the funded pensions is borne
by a much larger number of people, pensioners have to contribute less to pay off the funds’
deﬁcit; hence, their incomes remain relatively stable (compare ﬁgure 14 to ﬁgure 5, taking into
account the different scale of the vertical axes).
Wecomparethisswitchtoanaverage-wagesystem, whichusestheindexationinstrument, to
the case in which the switch was accompanied by the exclusive use of the premium instrument.
As we might expect, the pension beneﬁts increase less under the current system and net wages
and employment go up more than if the premium instrument is used (compare ﬁgures 15 and 16
to, respectively, ﬁgures 10 and 11).
In conclusion, we note that the use of the indexation instrument alleviates the pain that is asso-
ciated with the initial underfunding of the pension funds. If the indexation of the rights of active
workers is suspended under an average-wage system, the development of pensioners’ incomes
is more in line with that of workers, compared to the case in which the premium instrument is
used (compare ﬁgure 15 to ﬁgure 10 and ﬁgure 2) or to the case in which only the indexation of
pensioners’ rights is suspended (compare ﬁgure 15 to ﬁgure 6).
5 Government policy
The government has several options at her disposal to help with the problem of ageing. The
policy options have consequences for the national budget (including the costs associated with
the ﬁrst pillar-PAYG system) as well as for the pension funds (who manage the second pillar).
This paragraph analyzes the macroeconomic links between government policy, pension funds,
and intergenerational distribution. We discuss the reduction of government debt by raising taxes
to their long-run levels immediately and the encouragement of labor participation.
Constant taxes and premiums
In the simulations so far, government debt was kept constant as a fraction of national income
by adjusting the income tax rate on a yearly basis. Figure 1 shows that this policy implies that
those generations, that are active when the ageing of society peaks in 2040, pay relatively high
4The similarity between the two simulation scenarios can be observed when comparing ﬁgure 13
to the comparable ﬁgure in the previous exercise, ﬁgure 4.
9taxes. Several considerations, including the desire to spread the costs of ageing equally across
generations and avoid distortions due to ﬂuctuating tax rates, call for constant tax rates over
time. The level of this constant rate follows from the condition that the government has to stay
solvent. In practice, this means raising rates at the present time to pay off a part of the national
debt.
We simulate a scenario in which the government decides to enact this type of policy. The
results of the simulation are in ﬁgures 18 through 22. The rate of income tax is higher in the
initial years of the simulation, but lower in the later years (compare ﬁgure 19 to ﬁgure 1). In
this way, the costs of ageing are in fact brought forward. The national debt (as a percentage of
national income) decreases for two decades (ﬁgure 18) to stabilize at a level of 35% of GDP.5
Bringing the costs of ageing forward inﬂuences labor supply. By keeping the income tax rate
constant, the net wage will be lower in the base year but declines much less afterwards.6 This
stimulates labor supply at precisely the moment that the labor market is tight, due to population
ageing. Constantratesoftaxationthushelpthepricemechanismtoallocatelaborsupplytothose
periods in which labor is most scarce. Ageing, in this scenario, leads to a smaller ﬂuctuation in
the costs of labor, in production and in employment (compare ﬁgure 20 to ﬁgure 2 and ﬁgure 21
to ﬁgure 3). Not surprisingly, the welfare effects (ﬁgure 22) show that reducing the national
debt in anticipation of an ageing population taxes the current generations to the beneﬁt of future
generations.
Inthissimulation, healthinsuranceisnotcountedinthegovernmentbudget. Thosegovernment-
administered insurance funds change their premiums each year to avoid shortages. An alterna-
tive scenario, in which the insurance premiums are kept constant as well, leads to the elimination
of government debt in just two decades, after which it increases to about 16% of GDP.
Ageing and labor participation
Population ageing reduces the ratio between the number of active and retired members of so-
ciety. This trend can be offset by increasing labor participation among the active part of the
population. Increases in participation are possible, and have occured in the past. During the
last decades, for instance, the labor supplied by young women (between 20 and 45 years) has
increased markedly due to cultural changes and an increase in the educational attainment of that
group. Also, the opportunity to work part-time has made the labor market more accessible for
women with children. In the coming two decades, the women who have entered the labor market
in recent years will be part of the older half of the labor force (between 45 and 65 years). This
part of the labor force, especially that older than 55, has shown a decrease in participation over
the last thirty years (though this trend appears to have reversed slightly during the last half of the
90s). How labor force participation of 45-65 year-olds will develop in the future is uncertain,
and will depend on cultural developments as well as government policy aimed at stimulating
participation of older workers.
5Recent computations by the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analyses indicate
that sustainable public ﬁnance (through constant rates of taxation) requires the government debt to
decline to 15% of GDP in 2030. See CPB (2003b).
6The changes in net wage in ﬁgure 20 actually lead to a decline in net wage. This is caused by
increasing pension premiums in the early years, and by the increasing costs of health insurance in
the later years.
10Table 3: Participation in three age groups
year 2000
age group 20-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
labor participation
IMAGE base path 73.9% 68.7% 61.5% 42.7%
CPB projection 73.4% 70.5% 63.5% 42.2%
year 2010
age group 20-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
labor participation
IMAGE base path 70.5% 66.8% 58.6% 38.6%
CPB projection 75.2% 76.6% 69.3% 49.5%
year 2020
age group 20-44 45-49 50-54 55-59
labor participation
IMAGE base path 71.5% 65.9% 57.3% 35.7%
CPB projection 76.3% 78.5% 74.3% 53.9%
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analyses has developed several long-term
scenarios for labor participation. To ﬁnd out about the sensitivity of our simulations to changes
inlabor participation, we usean optimisticscenario forlaborsupply, theEuropeanCoordination
scenario (see CBS/CPB, 1997). Table 3 compares labor participation on our base path to the
development of participation in the CPB-scenario. In our projection, participation drops over
time, due to the increase in income tax rates over time (see ﬁgure 1). In the projection from
the CPB, however, the participation rate goes up; the recent increase in the participation of
older employees is continued into the next decade. This trend is explained by cultural changes,
that stimulate participation among older women, compared to their participation during earlier
cohorts. Cutbacks in early retirement schemes have also been taken into account. This allows us
to interpret the CPB’s scenario as a policy scenario in which labor participation is encouraged
in a number of ways.
We exogenously introduce the increase in labor participation that is stipulated by the CPB
scenario. The results of this simulation are in ﬁgures 23 through 24. In it, effective labor supply
will increase markedly for the next 15 years, due to the higher participation of older employees.
The supply of labor does decrease when the baby boom generation withdraws from the labor
market, but the size of the decline is smaller than in previous simulations (see ﬁgure 24). The
labor market goes through a cycle of relative abundance and relative scarcity. This development
is reﬂected in both the costs of labor (real wage falls until 2010, then peaks at 2030) and the rate
of income tax (ﬁgure 23). The effects on the net wage of changes in the gross wage are partly
negated by the changes in the rate of taxation. Taxes still have to go up in order to cover the
costs of population ageing, but the increase is much smaller than in previous simulations. This
indicates that the increase in labor participation is good news for the government in more than
one way. Firstly, wages increase less because of the increased supply of labor. This causes a
decline in the costs of government services, as well as enlarging the different tax bases. Sec-
11ondly, the larger premium base for pension funds allows them to lower the premium compared
to the base path (compare ﬁgures 23 and 1). The smaller ﬂuctuations in taxation cause the net
wage to respond less to demographic developments. Moreover, net wages have declined less
than previously estimated because of the somewhat lower pension premiums.
We ﬁnd that an increase in labor participation is a powerful cure for the problems caused by
population ageing. Its effects on the economy are beneﬁcial to growth and employment, while
keeping costs low for the government. The initiatives aimed at increasing participation should
therefore be welcomed; it is not certain, however, that they will be as effective as the scenario
from this paragraph assumes.
6 Risk analysis: capital market and life expectancy
This section explores the vulnerability of an ageing economy to risks. We look at the repercus-
sions of a negative shock in the return to capital, and an unexpected increase in life expectancy.
Both shocks will cause pension funds to respond, and we discuss different options for their
response. This will highlight the impact of the pension contract on the Dutch economy.
Ageing reduces the rate of return to capital...
Ageing OECD countries supply the bulk of capital on world ﬁnancial markets. The supply of
capital will probably increase in the coming years, as the baby boom generations save for their
retirement years The demand for capital, in contrast, will be low, because less jobs need to be
created for the shrinking labor force. It thus appears that the forces of supply and demand will
put downward pressure on the rate of return on capital.
We employ the interest rate projection of the INGENUE model, which is based on a world-
wide demographic scenario (Aglietta et al., 2001). The projection is in ﬁgure 25, and it conﬁrms
the above analysis: the model predicts a declining rate of return for the next two centuries, after
which a new equilibrium is found about 50 basis points below the real return of 4% that we
employed in our base projection. This projection accounts for the absorption of savings from
the OECD countries by the developing world, where the population is relatively young.
...as do budgetary problems.
Even though most European countries will have to cope, in differing degrees, with an ageing
population, not every country is as well prepared to take care of the future costs that this problem
will entail. Especially countries in which the provision of pensions is arranged mainly through a
pay-as-you-go system face ﬁscal imbalances. This could result in inﬂationary pressures as well
as a signiﬁcant increase in taxes, both with negative consequences for the investment climate
and the returns that Dutch pension funds can expect on their investment in these countries.
Lower rate of return means a lower coverage rate...
We are interested in the sensitivity of the Dutch economy, and especially the pension funds, to
the effects of a lower rate of return. We therefore analyze the effects of the INGENUE-scenario
that was introduced above in our own model of the Dutch economy. The fall in the return
to capital (together with the increase in wages caused by it) immediately causes a fall in the
12coverage ratio of pension funds. We study the effects of a number of possible responses to this
problem, where we use the same set of strategies that we studied in the previous section. In
the ﬁrst two simulations, funds keep the ﬁnal-wage system in place and deal with the lower rate
of return by increasing their premiums (ﬁgures 26 through 28) or by cutting the indexation of
current pension beneﬁts (ﬁgures 29 through 32).
...with higher premiums...
When pension funds use the premium instrument to increase their insufﬁcient coverage ratio,
the premiums quickly go up to the maximum level of 25% (see ﬁgure 26). Premiums are ﬁxed at
this level for the next 20 years, after which they return to their new steady state level just below
20%. This level exceeds the previous steady-state premium of 16.4%, which is a consequence
of the permanently lower rate of return (which is 3.5% instead of 4%).
...or lower beneﬁts.
An alternative course of action for the pension funds is to freeze premiums immediately at their
new long-run level of 19.6% (corresponding to the new steady-state rate of return of 3.5%)
and cope with the shortages by revoking the indexation of pensioners’ beneﬁts. The growth of
beneﬁts will, in that case, lag about 4% behind the growth of wages for eight years.7 After this
period, indexation of beneﬁts to wages is gradually restored.
Lower rates of return stimulate labor supply
The lower rate of return required by ﬁnancial markets serves to increase the level of invest-
ments. This is beneﬁcial to labor productivity and leads to higher gross wages. In the long
run, employment increases by 0.7%, while GDP grows by 2.5% (ﬁgures 28 en 32). In the case
in which the indexation instrument is used, changes in net wages are only small. As it turns
out, the higher gross wage rate is just about offset by the higher steady-state pension premium
(ﬁgure 31). Premiums are increased by a large amount if the premium instrument is used exclu-
sively (ﬁgure 26), which causes net wages and labor supply to drop initially (ﬁgures 27 and 28).
Using the indexation instrument prevents sizable short term effects on net wages and labor sup-
ply (compare ﬁgures 31 and 32 with ﬁgures 27 and 28, respectively) but severely decreases the
value of net pensions in the initial years (compare ﬁgures 31 and 27).
Welfare effects
Figure 33 shows the welfare effects of a negative shock in the rate of return for the different
cohorts under two different pension fund policies. In both cases, the fall in the rate of return
harms the welfare of future generations: their lower income from capital weighs heavier than
the (slightly) higher net wage. In the short run, the policy option chosen by pension funds
is important. The cohorts that were born around 1980 pay most if the premium instrument is
used. Cutting into the indexation of current pensions instead protects this generation, but instead
harms the welfare of those born around 1930.
7That the growth in beneﬁts is 4% slower than that in wages, is the result of 2% yearly inﬂation
and 2% technological growth in wages, when we assume that the funds are able to freeze nominal
pension beneﬁts.
13To average-wage with premium instrument...
For the second set of simulations, we assume that the fall in the rate of return is followed by
a transition to a system in which pension beneﬁts are tied to average wages, rather than ﬁnal
wages. We further assume that the transition takes place under the rules that were discussed
in the previous section. In these simulations, we ﬁnd that in case the premium instrument is
used, the path of pension premiums is much smoother than in the ﬁnal-wage system (compare
ﬁgures 34 and 26). While net wages remain under pressure for the ﬁrst twenty years because of
higher pension premiums, net pension beneﬁts turn out to be higher than before because of the
transitory regime,8 as are gross wages (to which these beneﬁts remain indexed).
...or with a more effective indexation instrument.
The scenarios in which an average-wage system with conditional indexation is introduced all
point to the increased effectiveness of the indexation instrument, as current as well as future
pension rights can be adjusted in the face of shortages. The broader base for bearing risks
ensures that the suspension of beneﬁt indexation only lasts a short while, compared to a ﬁnal-
wage system (compared to ﬁgure 30, indexation correction is only at its minimum level for one
year). Moreover, net wages and net pension beneﬁts do not diverge as sharply. Higher net wages
under the regime of conditional indexation stimulate the supply of labor in both the short and
the long run. The welfare effects indicate that the transition to an average-wage system protects
the middle- and lower incomes against the effects of a drop in the rate of return. The higher
incomes, however, experience a drop in their pension beneﬁts (see ﬁgures 37-38).
7 Nontradeables
When the baby boom generation retires, the local supply of labor will decrease. This will lead to
adeclineinDutchproductioncapacity, whileatthesametimetheassetsaccumulatedbypension
funds will provide the means to keep national consumption at its usual level. The money that
was saved and turned into foreign investments can then be used to import consumption goods to
serve the excess demand.
However, not all goods and services are internationally tradeable and can be imported. A
high demand for nontradeables combined with a reduced capacity to produce locally will cause
the real exchange rate to appreciate; that is, nontradeables will become more expensive relative
to tradeables. This change in relative prices will direct production factors from the tradeable- to
the non-tradeable sector, as that is the only way in which the local production of nontradeable
goods and services can meet local demand, despite the reduced availability of labor.
The reallocation of scarce labor from the tradeable- to the nontradeable sector, however,
will cause a period of stress on the labor market. As sector-speciﬁc skills and capital need to
be converted, wages will be higher than normal during the transition. This raises the price of
nontradeables and harms the competitiveness of the traded-goods sector and boosts the costs of
(labor-intensive) government services. Pension funds, who have indexed their beneﬁts to the
wage level, also see the value of their obligations rise.
8As we noted before, it is possible to construct a regime under which the transition to an average-
wage system would be less beneﬁcial to the older generations.
14We simulate a scenario in which the Dutch market sector is divided into two subsectors,
tradeable and non-tradeable. We use the deﬁnitions of exposed and sheltered sectors that have
been used in the CPB’s JADE model (CPB, 2003a). Government and the health sector form a
third sector. The employment shares of these sectors are in table 4.
Table 4: The size and production structure of the three sectors
Sector Tradeables Nontradeables Government and
health
Employment-
share in 1999 31% 44% 24%
Figure 39 shows the extent of the real appreciation due to the shift from tradeables to non-
tradeablesproduction. Afterthetransitionhasbeencompleted, thepriceofnontradeablesreverts
to its initial value. The scope of this transition is quite large: in 2040, the employment share of
the nontradeables sector has risen by 10 percentage points, from 44% tot 54%.
The effects that these developments on the goods market have on the rest of the economy
can be seen from ﬁgure 40. Gross wages rise much faster than they did in the benchmark path
(compare ﬁgure 40 to ﬁgure 2). Higher wage inﬂation due to a tight labor market results in an
increased liability for pension funds, as beneﬁts are tied to the level of wages. These higher
liabilities cause an increase in pension premiums.
8 Conclusions
The scenarios in this paper show the interdependencies between an ageing population and the
costs of labor, net wages, (funded) pension premiums and employment in a small, open econ-
omy. Ageing leads to a tighter labor market, higher wages and higher costs for the government.
Developments on the international ﬁnancial markets can, in addition to this, put pressure on the
rate of return to capital that pension funds can expect. The tight labor market at the peak of
population ageing exacerbates the problems for these pension funds because their beneﬁts have
historically been tied to the level of wages. The fact that part of the consumption bundle for
consumers has to be produced locally adds to the pressure on local wages. An increase in the
supply of labor, however, can smooth the costs of ageing over time. Moreover, better tradeabil-
ity of goods and services can help to ﬁght the effects of ageing has on the economy. Especially
an increase in older worker’s labor market participation can be a powerful to combat the costs
of aging.
The Dutch economy with its mature, deﬁned-beneﬁt pension funds turns out to be vulnera-
ble to the developments on international capital markets and to changes in the expected length
of life. Alternative rules of conduct regarding the division of these risks between working and
retired members of the funds have substantial effects on the division of welfare across gener-
ations. The tolerance for risk is increased markedly if the pension rights of both workers and
retirees can be decreased to repair a shortage in the coverage ratio, thus sharing the risks across
a larger number of generations. Also, the relative incomes of cohorts (and their income de-
15velopment) are more balanced if risks are shared in this way, compared to a situation in which
only the premium-instrument is used. The indexation-instrument affects employment much less,
leaving the economic base to pay for an ageing population intact. This helps to make the Dutch
economy more robust to the risks of ageing.
A Model expressions
A.1 Household optimization
Households derive utility from the consumption of tradable goods, health care, and leisure over
their remaining life. Households are distinguished by their year of birth (generation) t0, and
by their productivity type i. Productivity is exogenous to households but may vary with age.
The relative productivity of a household of type i at age τ is h(τ,i) and its wage rate is given
by h(τ, i)pl(t) as a consequence of perfect substitution between types in the production of
tradables.
We operationalize by specifying seven household types, whose wage proﬁle can be found
in ﬁgure 41. The share of these seven types in the population varies; we allow for a ﬁner grid
towards the higher earners to reﬂect the large variability in this segment. Shares can be read
from table 5.
Table 5: Type shares and pension sizes
type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 average
Share in population
12% 24% 24% 24% 12% 3% 2%
Ratio funded occupational pension to public pension
0% 14% 31% 65% 214% 248% 533% 69.4%
Note: Of these seven productivity types, number 1 is the least productive and
number 7 the most productive. The second statistic, the ratio of supplementary
pension income over public pension income, is an average over pension-aged
type members.
Denote the survival function of a household of generation t0 at time t by Λ(t,t0) ≤ 1.
Households maximize their expected utility, given by
E(U(t, t0, i)|t) = (1 − 1/γ)−1
t0+nT−1 X
τ=t
(1 + β)t−τ Λ(τ − t0 + 1, t0)
Λ(t − t0 + 1, t0)
u(τ, t0, i)1−1/γ
where γ denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity and β the rate of time preference. The














where c denotes consumption of tradables, v denotes leisure, and cz denotes consumption of
health care. Preference coefﬁcients θ depend on (i) the state of knowledge, reﬂected in the
labour productivity growth rate α, (ii) the productivity type i, to represent the idea that human
capital does not affect the labour-leisure choice, and (iii) age t − t0 + 1:
θv(t, t0 , i) = θ0 h(t − t0 + 1,i)ηh (1 + α)t0 (1 + θ)t0−t (ηh > 0)
θz(t, t0 , i) = θ1 h(t − t0 + 1,i)ηh (1 + α)t0 θt(t − t0 + 1,t0)
θt(t − t0 + 1,t0) = θt(t − t0,t0)

(1 + θ)η1 η2 λ(τ − t0,t0) + η3
η2 λ(τ + 1 − t0,t0) + η3
1/(1−σv)
where hηh represents the effect of productivity, θ and θt is the effect of age on leisure and health
care, respectively. The effect of age on the demand for health care is linked to the mortality
rate, λ(τ,t0) = 1 − Λ(τ + 1,t0)/Λ(τ,t0). Households can divide their time between leisure v,
labour l, and health care cz
l = lmax − v − cz ≥ 0 (1)
An important consequence of this formulation is that health care takes time that cannot be used
for leisure or labour.
Maximization of expected utility is a complicated problem, due to the restriction on total
time (1) above. We derive expressions for the supply of labor and the demand for tradeables and
health care in terms of shadow prices, which themselves follow from numerical computations.
A detailed treatment of the solution can be found in the model’s documentation, available on the
internet: http://image.ocfeb.nl.
A.2 Firm optimization
Firms in the tradable goods sector use capital K, labour L, and raw materials M to produce
output. Production is subject to (internal) adjustment costs in capital formation. Technical
change is purely labour augmenting, at rate α. Labour and raw materials are variable inputs.
Labour productivity is heterogeneous by age and skill type, but workers of all types are perfectly
substitutable. As above, let the productivity of a worker of age τ and of type i be equal to h(τ,i),
17then the production function reads as follows








ζM M−ρy + ζH H−ρy−1/ρy
H(t) =
h
ζK K(t)−ρH + ζL
 







h(t − τ + 1,i)L(t,τ,i)
Here gross output F is a CES-function of raw materials M and value added H, with substitution
elasticity σy = 1/(1 + ρy) (see table 1) . Value added H is produced by using beginning-of-
period capital stock K and labour input in efﬁciency units Leﬀ (with substitution elasticity
σH = 1/(1 + ρH)). The latter is deﬁned as the sum of the efﬁciency units supplied by the
nT age classes and the nI productivity types. Internal adjustment costs are subtracted in the
deﬁnition of net output y, where I denotes composite investment.
Firms maximize the present value of the stream of future dividends. Due to the rigidity in
the capital stock, the marginal value of labor in this production process varies over time. With
perfect labor markets, this variation leads to the path of gross wages that we use in this paper,
see for instance ﬁgure 2. Once again, mathematical optimization leads to a solution which is
detailed in the model’s documentation.
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Figure 3: Employments in millions of fte’s
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Figure 12: Welfare effects of a switch to
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Figure 17: Welfare effects of a switch to
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Figure 24: GDP (left, billions of euro’s)
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Figure 31: Gross wage, net wage and net
pensions relative to the base path after in-





2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
GDP
Employment
Figure 32: GDP and employment relative











Figure 33: Welfare effects interest shock
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premium after interest shock, with average
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Figure 37: Welfare effects of interest rate
















Figure 38: Welfare effects of interest rate
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